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I. INTRODUCTION: ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE CATHEDRAL 
This Article aims to contribute to the study of how the law should 
allocate and protect entitlements in the presence of externalities. In 
their classic article published thirty years ago, Calabresi and Melamed 
studied such questions and offered what they labeled "one view of the 
Cathedral."1 I seek to add to the inquiry started by Calabresi and 
Melamed by offering an ex ante perspective and analyzing how alloc"!­
tions of entitlements affect parties' ex ante actions and investments. 
Suppose that an upstream Factory would benefit from an activity 
that would pollute a river and harm an activity conducted by a down­
stream Resort. In this as in many other cases, the respective rights of 
the parties must be determined. Does Factory have the right to engage 
in the polluting activity, or does Resort .have the right to water free of 
pollution? If Resort is entitled to unpolluted water, should it be pro­
tected by a property right or by a liability rule?2 
Calabresi and Melamed, and the subsequent extensive literature on 
the subject,3 have primarily conducted what I will label an "ex post 
1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal­
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). This article is widely 
viewed as a seminal contribution to law economics and legal theory. See James E. Krier & 
Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 
2121 (1997) (demonstrating the influence of the article through citation analysis); Carol M. 
Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997) ("One View of the Cathedral 
is now so much a part of the legal canon that it is widely known by the joined names of its 
two authors .. . .  "). 
2. In addition to property rights and liability rules, Calabresi and Melamed also exam­
ined an additional form of protection - inalienability rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 1, at 111 1-15. This Article will focus, however, as much of the literature has done, on 
alienable rights that parties may sell or waive. For an economically oriented analysis of inal­
ienability rules, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). 
3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Op­
timal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(2001); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Fa­
cilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zan-
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analysis." I use this term to refer to an analysis·that takes as given the 
payoffs that parties would have with and without externality­
producing actions. In the above example, an ex post analysis would 
take as given both the presence of Factory and Resort and their poten­
tial costs and benefits from their respective activities. Taking these 
elements of the situation as given, the analysis would examine which 
entitlement allocations would lead to the efficient level, if any, of pol­
lution-producing activity on the part of Factory. 
The common starting point for an ex post analysis is the Coasean 
insight that, in cases in which the relevant parties can easily bargain ex 
post, the allocation of entitlements will matter little in terms of effi­
ciency.4 As long as parties can bargain around legal rules, the ex post 
outcome will be always efficient. Given that bargaining is subject to 
transaction costs and imperfect information, however, such ex post ef­
ficiency cannot be guaranteed. The ex post analysis therefore exam­
ines which allocation of entitlements would most likely facilitate the 
efficient outcome in a world where such obstacles to bargaining exist. 
This Article focuses on how ex ante decisions are affected by allo­
cations of entitlements. By ex ante decisions I mean throughout this 
Article those decisions that (i) take place before decisions whether to 
undertake externality-producing actions are made, and (ii) influence 
the parties' potential payoffs with or without these externality­
producing actions. Thus, in the considered example, the ex post pay­
offs of Factory and Resort with and without pollution might be a 
product of their ex ante decisions whether to locate along the river in 
the first place and, if so, how close to the river to locate; what scope of 
activities to develop; what products or services to provide; how many 
workers to hire and how much to invest in their human capital; and so 
forth. Such ex ante decisions are ubiquitous, of course, and they criti­
cally affect the ex post structure of cases the law must address.5 
ing: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 
(1973); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic 
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stuart J. Schwab, Property Rules 
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Li­
ability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Polinsky, 
Controlling Externalities]; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple 
Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980) [hereinafter 
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes]. 
4. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
5. Some of the researchers whose analysis focused on what I term ex post effects also 
recognized the presence of what I term ex ante effects. In particular, Kaplow and Shavell, 
supra note 3, at 738-39, discuss how any protection of victims might discourage them from 
making investments that would reduce the potential harm to them from externality­
producing actions. Kaplow and Shavell indicate that such a factor might influence the choice 
of rule, but they do not attempt to analyze the range of ex ante effects or the conditions un­
der which any given rule would be optimal from an ex ante perspective. Ayres and Talley, 
supra note 3, also discuss how ex ante considerations might militate against the use of liabil-
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To study the ex ante dimension of the Cathedral in isolation from 
the ex post problems extensively studied in prior work, I will put aside 
these problems by assuming that ex post bargaining between the par­
ties is easy. It is worth stressing, however, that I have no doubt that ex 
post considerations are important for legal decisionmaking in the ex­
ternalities context. To analyze the ex ante effects, however, it will be 
useful to abstract from the ex post problems, and to this end I will fo­
cus in this Article on situations in which ex post bargaining is easy. 
In examining the ex ante effects of alternative rules, my analysis 
builds on the large economic literature analyzing "incomplete con­
tracts."6 This literature has sought to analyze how the potential divi­
sion of surplus in later renegotiations might affect earlier investments. 
Although this literature has focused on contexts that differ from the 
harmful-externalities context on which I focus, its analytical approach 
has been useful for carrying out my analysis. 
It is worthwhile highlighting at the outset some general differences 
between an ex ante and an ex post analysis. From an ex post perspec­
tive, the distribution of ex post value between the parties has no rele­
vance for efficiency. To be sure, writers carrying an ex post analysis 
have differed on whether the distributive consequences of alternative 
rules have some importance by themselves, independent of the goal of 
efficiency. Such writers have nevertheless generally shared the view 
that ex post distribution is irrelevant from the perspective of efficiency 
itself. 
As the analysis of this Article demonstrates, however, once ex ante 
effects are taken into account, the ex post division of value might have 
considerable efficiency implications. Different divisions of ex post 
value lead to different ex ante actions and investments. As a result, a 
given rule's effects on the ex post division of the total pie have an im­
portant effect on the overall ex ante efficiency of the rule. 
Relatedly, the introduction of ex ante effects also makes the choice 
of legal rule important in cases in which ex post bargaining is easy. The 
standard ex post analysis assumes that, when the parties can easily 
bargain ex post, the choice of legal rule has little or no relevance for 
efficiency. In such cases, ex post bargaining can be expected to pro­
duce an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of enti­
tlements. For this reason, prior work has commonly focused on cases 
in which ex post bargaining is difficult or even impossible. 
ity rules, but they focus on the beneficial effect that liability rules have on ex post bargaining. 
Id. at 1083-90. 
6. See generally, OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
(1995); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A The­
ory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON., 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John 
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart 
& John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
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As the analysis of this Article will show, however, once we take ex 
ante effects into account, the choice of rule might have important effi­
ciency implications even when ex post bargaining is easy. By affecting 
the bargaining positions of each party in ex post bargaining, the choice 
of rule will affect the ex post division of value. This ex post division of 
value, in tum, will affect ex ante incentives and thereby ex ante effi­
ciency. 
My analysis therefore begins by examining how various alternative 
rules affect bargaining between parties and, in turn, the ex post divi­
sion of value. To illustrate these effects, note that, in the considered 
example, Factory would generally fare better if it had a property right 
to pollute rather than if Resort had a property right to enjoin Factory's 
pollution. Suppose that Factory and Resort can freely bargain with 
one another, and suppose also that pollution would be efficient be­
cause the value to Factory of the pollution-causing activity exceeds the 
harm it imposes on Resort. Given easy ex post bargaining, both rules 
would result in polluting by Factory. The rules would differ, however, 
in the distribution of value between Factory and Resort that they 
would produce. 
If Factory had the property right, it could keep the full value of its 
pollution-producing activities to itself. By contrast, if Resort had the 
property right, Factory would not be able to capture fully the value of 
its pollution-producing activity. Resort would be able to extract some 
of this value in exchange for consenting to Factory"s pollution.7 
After identifying the distributive effects of alternative rules, the 
analysis will examine how these different ex post distributions of value 
affect parties' ex ante investments. Consider the incentives for Factory 
to invest ex ante in enhancing the value it can derive from its activities. 
If Resort had a property.right to enjoin Factory, Factory would invest 
too little ex ante, because Resort's property right would enable Resort 
to extract part of the value created by this investment. Because Fac­
tory can anticipate this need to share the value of its activity with Re­
sort, it would not have incentives to invest optimally. In contrast, if 
Factory were granted a property right to pollute, Factory would not 
have to share with Resort any part of the value produced by Factory's 
ex ante investment. Thus, granting a property right to Factory would 
encourage it to invest ex ante. Indeed, for reasons to become clear 
later, if Factory were granted a property right, it would even tend to 
invest excessively. 
Now suppose that Resort were granted an entitlement to a pollu­
tion-free river but with the weaker protection of a liability rule. In this 
7. Similarly, if pollution were inefficient, any allocation of entitlements would result in 
no pollution, but different rules would produce different distributions of total value. If Re­
sort were granted the property right, it would not have to pay to induce Factory not to pol­
lute, whereas if Factory received the property right, Resort would have to pay. 
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case, Factory would still have an incentive to invest. Under this liabil­
ity rule, if Factory were to operate, Factory would pay Resort the 
(court-estimated) harm that pollution would inflict on Resort. As a re­
sult, Factory would retain the excess of the value of its activity over 
this harm, and Factory would thus fully capture any incremental in­
crease in the value produced by its ex ante investment. Consequently, 
Factory would have an incentive to invest at the efficient level. 
Consider also the effects of the allocation of entitlements on Re­
sort's incentives to invest ex ante in enhancing the value of its activi­
ties. If Resort were granted a property right to pollution-free water, 
Resort would have incentives to invest, and indeed might even invest 
excessively. Providing Resort with the entitlement protected only by a 
liability rule would not solve this problem of excessive investment. In­
deed, as the analysis will show, liability rule protection would lead Re­
sort to make investments that would be excessive to a degree even 
greater than under a property-right rule. 
In addition to ex ante investments in enhancing the values of the 
parties' respective activities, the analysis will also examine Factory's 
and Resort's ex ante investments in reducing the harm that would re­
sult in the event of conflicting use. Factory and Resort, for example, 
could make investments to eliminate or reduce their reliance on the 
river in case a conflicting use problem arises down the road. The 
choice of rule might affect also these investments. 
If Resort were granted the entitlement with a liability-rule protec­
tion, Resort would have no incentive to make any such potentially 
harm-reducing investments. In this case, however, Factory would have 
an incentive to invest in harm reduction at the socially optimal level. 
In contrast, giving a property right to either of the parties would pro­
vide each party with incentives to make some - but less than socially 
optimal - investments in harm reduction. 
The choice of legal rule thus involves a number of ex ante consid­
erations. The optimal rule from an ex ante perspective depends on a 
balance of these considerations. The analysis of this Article will pro­
vide a framework for determining which allocations of entitlements 
would perform best from the perspective of ex ante efficiency. This 
framework could be used in answering the two questions that, for any 
given context involving externalities, the law must resolve: (i) which 
party should get the entitlement?, and (ii) what form of protection 
should be provided to this party? 
The analysis will show that, from the perspective of ex ante effi­
ciency, liability rules are not generally superior to property rights. This 
conclusion is worth noting because the literature has identified certain 
ex post advantages of liability rules. The analysis also indicates that we 
may want to expand our menu of alternative rules and include in it li­
ability rules based on supercompensatory or undercompensatory dam­
ages. Finally, the analysis identifies certain advantages that the use of 
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government fines and taxes has in terms of inducing optimal ex ante 
investments. 
Before proceeding, I should note that the analysis of this Article is 
limited to the choice between property rules and liability rules in cases 
of harmful externalities. Calabresi and Melamed's article raised the 
question of why, in cases involving possessory interests, courts gener­
ally protect ownership with a property right rather than a liability rule. 
As Kaplow and Shaven have demonstrated, however, this protection­
of-ownership context differs substantially from the harmful­
externalities context.8 In another work, I carry out an ex ante analysis 
of the protection-of-ownership question.9 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II intro­
duces the problem of externalities and discusses the differences be­
tween ex post and ex ante perspectives. Part III analyzes the effects of 
alternative legal rules on the ex post division of value between parties. 
Part IV uses this analysis to identify and examine the effects of alter­
native rules on parties' ex ante investments. Part V discusses the im­
plications that ex ante considerations have for legal policy and the se­
lection of legal rules. Part VI concludes. 
II. THE EX POST VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL 
A. The Conflicting-Use Problem 
This Section discusses the question occupying both prior literature 
and this Article: How should we address the extremely common situa­
tion in which uses of assets conflict - that is, in which the use of one 
asset imposes an externality on the use of another asset? For exposi­
tional convenience, the analysis will proceed with reference to a para­
digmatic example. As will be apparent, however, the conclusions de­
rived with respect to this paradigmatic case have general applicability 
to other cases of harmful externalities. 
To continue with our example from the preceding Part, suppose 
again that an industrial factory, Factory, stands on a river upstream 
and a recreational resort, Resort, stands on the river downstream. The 
time is the year 2000. At this point in time a problem of conflicting use 
of the river's water arises and must be resolved by the law. As is stan­
dard in the analysis of ex post problems, this Part assumes that all the 
elements characterizing the problem have been fixed: the parties al­
ready exist in their respective locations and face certain potential 
8. See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 757-83. 
9. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Ownership and Exchange (2001) (unpublished working pa­
per) (on file with author). 
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benefits and costs from using the river. The following Parts will relax 
this restrictive assumption. 
The conflicting use problem arises because Factory might benefit 
from engaging in a certain activity that would affect the river's water in 
a way that might impose harm on Resort. I will refer to this use of the 
water by Factory as "polluting" the water, and I will denote the benefit 
that Factory would derive from this activity as VF' Thus, if Factory 
were not to pollute, it would lose VF. For the purpose of my analysis, it 
does not matter whether Factory's considered activity is the only ac­
tivity available to Factory or whether there are additional activities 
that do not pollute the river. It matters only that this polluting activity 
would provide Factory with a value, which would not materialize oth­
erwise, in the amount of VF' 
Further suppose that pollution of the river's water by Factory 
would reduce the value of a potential activity of Resort. If the water 
remained free of Factory's pollution, Resort's activity would generate 
a value of Vw If Factory were to pollute the water, however, Resort's 
activity would generate only a value of VR - H, where H represents the 
loss that Resort would suffer from pollution as a result of, say, a de­
cline in the prices it could charge or a decrease in the number of its pa­
trons. 
Note that Resort can always shut down its activity altogether 
rather than operate suboptimally under pollution. Hence, if pollution 
would cause Resort a level of harm exceeding the value of its activity, 
Resort can simply cease to engage in the activity, thereby limiting it­
self to a loss of Vw Accordingly, the damages Resort will suffer will 
never exceed VR and will always equal the lesser of VR and H. Again, 
for the purposes of our analysis it does not matter whether the activity 
in question constitutes Resort's sole activity or merely one among 
many; it only matters that Factory's pollution would damage one of 
Resort's activities in an amount equal to the lesser of H and VR. 
We can view the scenario described above as one involving an ex­
ternality problem. Factory externalizes part of the costs produced by 
its activity. This externality equals the amount by which Factory's ac­
tivity reduces the value of Resort's activity and thus equals the lesser 
of VR and H. We can also refer to the problem as a conflicting-use 
problem. Both parties would benefit from using the water, but because 
the water can only be either polluted or unpolluted, both parties can­
not simultaneously use the water to their maximum benefit. Thus, a 
conflict arises: one party desires to use the water in a way inconsistent 
with the other party's desired use. 
I shall refrain from labeling Factory as the "injurer" or Resort as 
the "victim." Although convenient, these labels carry normative bag­
gage because we tend to perceive of the "injurer" as the party that 
causes the conflicting-use problem. As Coase has taught us, however, 
we should view the problem as a priori symmetric, with both parties 
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causing the conflicting-use situation. To be sure, but for Factory, Re­
sort could use the unpolluted water to its own benefit. On the other 
hand, but for Resort, Factory could pollute the water to its own bene­
fit just as well. Both parties thus contribute an essential element to the 
existence of the conflicting-use problem. 
B.  The Efficient Ex Post Outcome 
The most efficient resolution of the conflicting-use problem is the 
outcome that would maximize total aggregate value given the struc­
ture of the situation and the values of VF, VR, and H. As Table 1 below 
indicates, there are three possible scenarios as to which outcome 
would be efficient. 
(i) Scenario FR. In this scenario, it would be efficient for both Fac­
tory and Resort to engage in their respective activities; that is, Factory 
should pollute and Resort should continue its activity despite the pol­
lution. This scenario arises whenever the following two conditions 
hold true: (i) the value that pollution would bring to Factory would ex­
ceed the harm it would cause Resort (VF > H); but (ii) Resort still 
would derive a positive value from its activity, despite the harm from 
pollution (VR > H). 
(ii) Scenario F. In this scenario, it would be efficient that only Fac­
tory engage in its activity; that is, Factory should pollute, and Resort 
should shut down its harmed activity. This scenario would arise when­
ever the following two conditions hold true: (i) the harm Resort would 
suffer exceeds the benefit it would gain if it engaged in its activity de­
spite pollution (VR < H); but (ii) the benefit Factory would derive from 
polluting exceeds the harm that pollution would cause Resort (VF > 
VR). 
(iii) Scenario R. In this scenario, efficiency calls for only Resort to 
engage in its activity and for Factory to shut down. This scenario arises 
whenever both the harm to Resort caused by pollution and the value 
of Resort's activity exceed the value of the polluting activity to Factory 
(H >VF and VR >VF). 
TABLE 1. THE THREE SCENARIOS 
Factory Undertakes Resort Undertakes 
Outcome Polluting Activity? Activity? Total Social Value 
FR Yes Yes V, + v.-H 
F Yes No v, 
R No Yes v. 
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C. Law's Choice: Calabresi and Melamed's Four Rules 
What legal rules should govern the conflicting-use problem? In 
analyzing this question, I will use the classification of alternative legal 
rules put forward by Calabresi and Melamed and subsequently fol­
lowed by much of the literature.10 Under this classification, four alter­
native rules need to be considered:11 
(i) Entitlement to Resort Protected by a Property Right (the RP 
rule). Under this rule, Resort has an entitlement to operate free of 
pollution under the protection of a property right. In this case, if Re­
sort does not wish to allow Factory to pollute, Resort can secure an 
injunction against Factory (backed, if needed, by criminal sanctions). 
(ii) Entitlement to Resort Protected by a Liability Rule (the RL 
rule). Under this rule, Resort again has an entitlement to operate free 
of pollution, but this time under the weaker protection of a liability 
rule. Factory may elect to pollute, but in this case it would have to pay 
Resort a court-estimated amount for the damages caused to Resort. 
Recall that these damages would equal the smaller of the harm re­
sulting from the pollution and the value of Resort's activity in the ab­
sence of pollution - that is, the smaller of H and VR - as Resort 
would always have the option of shutting down its activity. 
(iii) Entitlement to Factory Protected by a Property Right (the FP 
rule). Under this rule, Factory has an entitlement to pollute protected 
by a property right. Therefore, Factory would be free to pollute at its 
discretion. 
(iv) Entitlement to Factory Protected by a Liability Rule (the FL 
rule). Under this rule, Factory again has an entitlement to pollute but 
this time under the weaker protection of a liability rule. In this case, 
Resort may still make Factory cease its polluting activity, but if Resort 
were to do so, Resort would have to pay Factory an amount that 
equals the court-estimated damages caused to Factory as a result: the 
loss of the value V r Note that the FL rule is rarely used in practice, 
10. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1 115-16; see also Frank I. Michelman, 
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 
670 (1971) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970)). 
1 1 .  As will be clear to readers, the analysis of this Article can be extended to identify the 
ex ante effects of additional rules. Some recent work has suggested additional rules based on 
the use of options. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres, The 1998 Monsanto Lecture: Protecting Property with 
Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998) (reviewing the choice of rule within the put/call frame­
work); Ayres & Balkin, supra note 3, at 729-33 (discussing put options and the way these op­
tions might be auctioned); Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 471-72 (envisioning a rule 
granting Factory the option to shut down its activity and collect damages from Resort); Saul 
Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2149, 2153-60 (1997) (suggesting additional rules); RONEN AVRAHAM, MODULAR 
LIABILITY RULES, (Olin Center for Law and Economics, University of Michigan, Working 
Paper No. 01-003) (analyzing a group of options-based rules). 
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perhaps due to the stringent informational requirements it imposes on 
courts. For the sake of completeness, however, I will include this rule 
in the analysis.12 
Significantly, all of these rules differ in the informational require­
ments they impose on courts. Under both property rules, FP and RP, 
the court needs only to verify whether Factory pollutes the river. In 
contrast, under the RL rule, a court not only has to verify whether 
Factory pollutes but also to estimate the damages produced by the 
pollution. The imperfect information of courts might therefore make it 
difficult to obtain ex post efficiency. To focus on the analysis of ex 
ante effects, however, I shall put aside these informational issues, and 
I shall assume for simplicity that courts can ex post accurately observe 
H, VF> and Vw 
D. Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Efficiency 
1. From Ex Post to Ex Ante 
As already emphasized, prior work has largely focused on identi­
fying the rule that would facilitate attainment of the ex post efficient 
outcome. Taking as given the presence of a potential externality, and 
recognizing that in a world of costless bargaining the efficient outcome 
will always occur under any of the four rules, Calabresi and Melamed 
stressed the importance of identifying the impediments to an ex post 
efficient outcome.13 Having identified these impediments, the efficient 
allocation of entitlements in any given case would be the one that 
would most likely attain the ex post efficient outcome. Much work has 
subsequently focused on this question. 
Although the ex post view yields insights that have much relevance 
for legal policymaking, such an analysis is significantly incomplete. In 
the context of our paradigmatic example, an ex post analysis would 
take as given the existence of Factory and Resort in the year 2000; 
their location along the river; and the potential costs and benefits that 
would arise from pollution or from its absence, which we have denoted 
by VF> VR, and H. With these elements taken as given, the focus is on 
which legal rule would lead to the efficient ex post outcome. 
12. But see Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del. E. Webb Dev. Co. , 469 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (or­
dering a cattle feedlots operator to shut down, and the developer of a neighboring retirement 
community to indemnify the feedlots operator for the costs of moving or shutting down). See 
generally Krier & Schwab, supra note 3, at 467-70 (discussing in detail the "paradox of rule 
four"). But see A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE L.J. 
2209 (1997) (arguing that "Rule 4" remedies are widely used in public law contexts). 
13 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1 106-11 (analyzing how different types of 
transaction costs affect the choice between property rights and liability rules). 
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These elements of the situation, however, might very well have 
arisen as a function of actions occurring at some point in the past, 
which in tum may well have been influenced by the legal rule that the 
parties anticipated would govern in the event that a conflicting-use 
problem would arise in the future. As a result, the choice of legal rule 
has important ex ante effects. Before turning to a detailed analysis of 
these effects, however, I wish to make two general observations about 
the consequences of incorporating such effects into the analysis. 
2. Ex Post Distribution Matters for Efficiency 
Clearly, the choice of legal rule can have significant distributive 
consequences, affecting how total value is divided between Factory 
and Resort. Prior work has recognized this effect that rules have on 
the final distribution of value.14 This literature has generally taken the 
view, however, that these distributional consequeqces have no rele­
vance for efficiency. Rather, in the standard ex post analysis, efficiency 
consists only of ensuring ex post that factory would pollute if and 
when doing so would be efficient - that is, would maximize the total 
pie of the parties. 
To be. sure, commentators have expressed different views on 
whether distribution of this total ex post pie should constitute an inde­
pendent objective of legal policy. Calabresi and Melamed, for exam­
ple, take the view that "difficult as wealth distribution preferences are 
to analyze, it should be obvious that they play a crucial role in the set­
ting of entitlements."15 In contrast, Kaplow and Shaven have taken the 
view that "concern about the distribution of income has no bearing on 
the choice between property rules and liability rules."16 
Nonetheless, writers have generally shared the view that, as far as 
efficiency is concerned, the ex post distribution of value does not mat­
ter. For example, although Calabresi and Melamed believe that the 
distributional consequences of the choice of rules should be given 
some weight in themselves, 17 they view these distributional conse-
14. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098-1102; Polinsky, Resolving Nui­
sance Disputes, supra note 3 at 1089-92. 
15. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098. 
16. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 744; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 ·J. 
LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that the choice of legal rules should not be influenced by 
distributional considerations because redistributing income through the income tax and 
transfer systems would be superior). 
17. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Calabresi and Melamed consider distribution a legiti­
mate objective of legal policy. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1098-1102, 1 1 10. 
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quences as irrelevant for the evaluation of this choice from the per­
spective of efficiency.18 
Once we take ex ante considerations into account, the distribution 
of the ex post value does make a difference to overall-efficiency. The 
size of the total pie under the most efficient ex post outcome depends 
on the parties' ex ante actions and investments. These actions and in­
vestments, in tum, depend in part on the ex post distribution of value 
that the parties anticipate ex ante. Hence, total value - that is, the to­
tal size of the pie - depends not only on whether a legal rule reaches 
the efficient outcome in any given ex post situation, but also on which 
ex post situation the rule produces in the first place. 
It is worth comparing the point under consideration to the claim 
made by various writers that distribution might affect efficiency be­
cause changes in the final distribution of wealth might affect parties' 
relative valuations of an entitlement.19 In our example, for instance, it 
might be argued that, for any given ex post situation, the value that 
Factory and Resort would place on the river's water would not be in­
dependent of the allocation of entitlements. 
Although the point made by these writers and the point made in 
this Section both imply that ex post distribution matters for efficiency, 
they very much differ. Note that these writers do not claim that ignor­
ing distributional effects might lead to an inefficient outcome. Rather, 
they claim only that the efficient outcome and efficient rule are often 
indeterminate. Consequently, they argue efficiency alone cannot pro­
vide a basis for selecting between two equally efficient outcomes and 
the rules that underlie them. In contrast, the analysis of this Article 
suggests that ignoring the ex ante effects of the final distribution of 
value might sometimes lead to the selection of a rule that would be 
unambiguously less efficient. 
18. Id. at 1093-98, 1106-10. 
19. Such claims were made in works by scholars associated with the Critical Legal Stud­
ies movement. See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in 
the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CALL. REV. 669, 678-95 (1979) (arguing that the price that a party 
is willing to pay prevent a harm from happening might differ from the price the party will ask 
for allowing the harm to happen, and analyzing the implications of this phenomenon for the 
Coase theorem); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Cri­
tique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981) (noting the same). Work in behavioral economics 
and in psychology has shown that initial allocations of entitlements can indeed affect valua­
tions. See, e.g. , W. Michael Hanemann et al., Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept: 
How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635 (1991); Elizabeth Hoffman & Mat­
thew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implica­
tions, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59 (1993) (investigating evidence on the divergence between will­
ingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay measures of value and exploring the implications of 
the divergence for analysis in law and economics); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329-42 
(1990) (reporting experiments showing asking prices to be higher than offer prices). 
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3. Rules Matter Even When Ex Post Bargaining Is Easy 
From the ex post perspective extensively applied by prior work, 
legal rules matter only when parties cannot easily bargain ex post. In 
the context of our example, this position implies that legal rules woulq 
matter only if, in the year 2000 when Factory and Resort confront. the 
conflicting-use problem, they were unable to bargain easily and reach 
an agreement. For this reason, an ex post analysis directs our attention 
to cases in which ex post bargaining is difficult or even impossible. 
Once ex ante considerations are taken into account, however, the 
choice of legal rule might matter greatly even where parties can easily 
bargain ex post. Suppose that, in the year 2000, Factory and Resort 
can successfully bargain, and thereby attain the ex post efficient out­
come, under any legal rule. The choice of legal rule inight still have 
substantial influence on the ultimate division of value hetween. Factory 
and Resort and thus, in turn, substantial influence on Factory and Re­
sort's ex ante incentives. As a result, even assuming easy bargaining in 
2000, alternative legal rules can substantially differ in their effects on 
overall efficiency. 
Of course, the suggestion that rules matter also when ex post bar­
gaining is easy does not take issue with the Coase theorem. In a world 
with no transaction costs at any point in time, parties would reach 
agreements at early stages to ensure that they make all their ex ante 
investments efficiently. A truly Coasean, transaction-cost-free world 
involves freedom from transaction costs not only at the time in which 
the externality arises but also at any earlier point in time in which 
some relevant investments and actions take place. The absence of 
transaction costs ex post, however, does not imply the presence of 
Coasean bargaining in all relevant earlier points in time. Thus, even 
when bargaining is ex post very easy, the choice of legal rule might 
matter in terms of efficiency. 
III. THE EFFECT OF RULES ON THE EX POST DIVISION OF VALUE 
Having made some general observations about ex ante considera­
tions, I now turn to analyzing how the choice of rule affects ex ante ac­
tions and decisions. This Part will take the first step in this analysis by 
comparing alternative rules in terms of their effects on the ex postdi­
vision of value.20 
To abstract away from ex post issues, I will assume that the parties 
can easily, and indeed with. no impediments whatsoever, bargain ex 
20. For an analysis of the effects of property rights and liability rules on the division of 
value in disputes between patent-holders and second-stage inventors infringing on these pat­
ents, see Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting 
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001). 
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post. This implies, among other things, that bargaining involves nei­
ther transaction costs nor informational asymmetries. 
In particular, I assume that both parties know each other's payoffs. 
I also assume that courts can accurately assess all the values relevant 
for implementing the rules under consideration. Under these condi­
tions, the parties will reach the ex post efficient outcome under any 
one of the alternative rules. The division of value, however, will differ 
considerably among alternative legal rules. 
For the ease of exposition, I make the simplifying assumption that 
the parties have equal bargaining power and therefore will share 
equally in any gains from mutual trade. This assumption will not affect 
our qualitative conclusions about ex ante effects, and it will be appar­
ent to the reader that the analysis can be adjusted to accommodate dif­
ferent assumptions about the parties' relative bargaining power. 
Below I will analyze bargaining and the distribution of value pro­
duced by it in each of the three scenarios concerning the efficient out­
come identified in Section 11.B. 
A Scenario FR: Factory and Resort Should Both Operate 
In this scenario, both Factory and Resort should operate. As iden­
tified earlier, this scenario arises whenever VF > H and VR > H. Under 
the RP rule, Factory must secure Resort's consent to conduct its pol­
luting activity. When pollution takes place, Resort's value from its own 
activity is reduced by H, but Factory obtains a value of VF' The net so­
cial surplus created by pollution, then, equals VF - H. In order to ob­
tain Resort's consent, Factory would have to compensate Resort for its 
damages, H, as well as pay Resort part of this net surplus. 
Therefore, under the assumption that the parties share equally in 
gains from trade, Factory would pay Resort for its harm, H, plus half 
the amount of VF - H. The final division of value would thus be as fol­
lows: Factory would net 0.5(VF- H), and Resort would net VR + 0.5(VF 
- H). The property protection that Resort enjoys would enable it not 
only to recover compensation for its damages from pollution but also 
to extract some of the surplus generated by Factory's activity. 
In contrast, under the RL rule, Factory could pollute the river 
without Resort's consent as long as it pays Resort damages in an 
amount that equals H. In the scenario under consideration, the benefit 
of pollution to Factory exceeds the harm that pollution causes Resort 
(VF > H). Thus, Factory would decide to.pollute and compensate Re­
'sort for H. Factory, however, would not need to offer Resort any part 
of the surplus produced by Factory's activity. Under the final division 
of value, Factory would net VF - H, and Resort would net VR' Under 
liability-rule protection, no bargaining would take place because Re-
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sort could not extract from Factory an amount exceeding H and would 
have no reason to agree to any amount below H. 
Under the FP rule, Factory's property right would enable it to op­
erate and pollute. Because it is efficient for Factory to operate in the 
scenario under consideration, the parties would have no incentive to 
bargain for a reallocation of their entitlements. Under the final divi­
sion of value, Factory would net VF, and Resort would net VR - H. 
Under an FL rule, Resort would have the right to prevent Factory 
from polluting if it pays Factory damages in the amount of VF" In the 
scenario under consideration, however, the harm to Resort from pollu­
tion would be less than the value of pollution to Factory. Hence, Re­
sort would prefer to operate under pollution rather than exercise the 
option granted to it by the rule. In the final division of total value be­
tween the parties, Factory would net VF, and Resort would net 
VR-H. 






Payments Made by 
Factory Value to Factory Value to Resort 
H + O.S(V,.- H) 0.5(V,.- H) v. + 0.5(V,- H) 
H V,- H  v. 
No Payment v, v. - H  
No Payment v, V. - H  
B. Scenario F: Only Factory Should Operate 
Total Value 
V, + v. - H  
V, + V. - H  
V, + v. - H  
V, + V. -H 
In this scenario, it is efficient for Factory to operate and for Resort 
to shut down its activity. As noted earlier, this scenario arises when­
ever V R < H and VF> H. 
Under the RP rule, Resort would have a right to operate and pol­
lute. Given that the value of pollution to Factory would exceed the 
value to Resort of operating free of pollution, however, Resort would 
"sell" its right to Factory and shut down its operations because such a 
transaction would produce a surplus of VF -Vw In such an exchange, 
Factory would be expected to pay Resort an amount that would com­
pensate Resort for the forgone value of its activity and, furthermore, 
would provide Resort with a fraction of the surplus produced by the 
exchange. Under the assumption of equal sharing of surplus, Resort 
would end up netting VR + 0.5(VF-VR), and Factory would end up net­
ting VF-0.5(VF +VJ. 
Under the RL rule, Factory would be able to operate without Re­
sort's consent, provided only that Factory pay Resort its damages. Be-
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cause it would be efficient for Resort to shut down its activity alto­
gether in the presence of pollution, these damages would equal Vw 
Whereas Resort would be compensated for the lost benefit from its 
potential activity, Resort would be unable to extract from Factory any­
thing more than these damages. The final division of value would pro­
vide Factory with a net value of VF - VR and Resort with a net value of 
Vw 
Under the FP rule, Factory would have the right to operate with­
out paying any damages. Because it would indeed be efficient for Fac­
tory to operate, the parties would have no incentive to bargain over a 
reallocation of entitlements. Also, because the potential harm to Re­
sort from operating under pollution would exceed the potential value 
to Resort from its activity, Resort would shut down. In the final divi­
sion of value, Factory would net VF and Resort would end up with no 
value. 
Finally, under the FL rule, Resort would have the power to force 
Factory to shut down its polluting activity by paying Factory damages 
equal to the value of Factory's activity, V r However, because the 
value of Factory's activity exceeds the potential value of Resort's ac­
tivity, VF > VR, Resort would prefer not to exercise this option and 
would shut down its own activity instead. The final division of value 
would provide Factory with a net value of VF and provide Resort with 
no value. 






Payments Made by 
Factory Value to Factory Value to Resort 
v. + 0.5(V, - V.) V, - 0.5(V, + V.) 0.5(V. + V,) 
v. V,- v. v. 
No Payment v, 0 
No Payment v, 0 






In this scenario, it is efficient for Resort to operate and for Factory 
to shut down, as VF is lower than both H and Vw 
Under the RP rule, Factory would be allowed to operate only if it 
obtained Resort's consent, but it would not be worthwhile for Factory 
·to pay as much as would be needed to obtain such consent. Because 
the value of Factory's polluting activity in the considered scenario 
does not exceed the damages from pollution to Resort, the parties 
would have no incentive to bargain over the reallocation of rights. 
618 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:601 
Factory would end up with no value, and Resort would end up with a 
value of VR. 
Under the RL rule, Factory would prefer to shut down its activity 
rather than operate and pay the damages to Resort as required by the 
rule. Thus, again, Factory would end up with no value, and Resort 
would end up with VR' 
Under the FP rule, Factory would agree not to use its right to op­
erate in return for a payment from Resort. In this exchange, Factory 
would be able to extract a price equal to the value of its activity, VF, 
plus a fraction of the surplus produced by the exchange. 
The size of this surplus would depend on the relative magnitudes of 
H and VR. In the case in which the value of Resort's activity exceeds 
the potential harm from pollution, VR > H, the damages to Resort 
from pollution would equal H, and the surplus from Factory's shutting 
down its activity would be H -VF. Under the assumption of equal bar­
gaining power, Factory would receive an amount equal to the forgone 
benefits from its polluting activity, VF' plus half the surplus, that is, 
0.5(H - VF). Resort in turn would end up with a value equal to VR 
minus the payment of VF + 0.5(H - VF) made to Factory, an amount 
equal to VR -0.5(VF + H). 
In contrast, in the case in which the potential harm to Resort from 
pollution exceeds the value of Resort's activity, H > VR, pollution 
would lead Resort to shut down, the damages to Resort from pollution 
would be VR, and the surplus produced by Factory's shutting down 
would thus be VR - V r Under the assumption of equal bargaining 
power, Resort would again pay Factory for its forgone benefits, VF, 
plus half the net surplus, VR -VF, and Factory thus would end up with 
a value of 0.5(VR +VF). Resort would end up with a value of VR -VF-
0.S(VR-VF), an amount equal to VR - 0.5(VR +VF). 
Finally, under the FL rule, Resort would have the power to pre­
vent Factory's pollution by paying Factory damages in an amount 
equal to the value of its forgone activity, V r In this case, Factory 
would not be able to extract from Resort any payment in excess of VF 
but, on the other hand, would have no reason to accept any offer of 
payment below Vr The final division of value thus would provide 
Factory with a net value of VF and Resort with a net value of VR - Vr 
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TABLE 4. DIVISION OF VALUE IN SCENARIO R 
Payments Made 
. ' 
Rule · by Resort Value to Factory Value to Resort Total Value 
RP No Payment 0 VR VR 
RL No Payment 0 VR VR 
FP V, + 0.5(H - V,) 0.S(V, + H) VR - 0.5(V, + H) 
(if VR > H) (if VR > H) (if VR > H) 
or or or VR 
v, + 0.5(VR - V,) 0.5(V, + VR) VR - 0.5(V, + VR) 
(if VR < H) (if VR < H) (if VR < H) 
FL v, v, VR - v, VR 
The analysis of this final scenario .R completes our comparison of 
the legal rules in terms of their ex post distributive consequences. I 
shall now tum to examine how these differences in ex post division 
translate into different ex ante behavior as well. 
IV. THE EX ANTE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE RULES 
This Part analyzes the effects of alternative rules on ex ante in­
vestments. Section A introduces ex ante investments into the analysis. 
Sections B and C then examine the effects of the four alternative rules 
on parties' ex ante investments in enhancing the values of their activi­
ties. Section D next analyzes the rules' effects on ex ante investment in 
harm reduction. Finally, Section E provides an overall comparison of 
the rules in terms of their ex ante effects. 
A. Introducing Ex Ante Investments 
Following the standard analysis of. the ex post problem, we have 
thus far treated as given the values defining the situation at hand: the 
potential value of Factory's activity, VF; the potential value of Resort's 
activity, VR; and the potential harm resulting from joint operation by 
the parties, H. These values, however, might be a product of the par­
ties' actions at earlier points in time. 
For example, the value of Resort's and Factory's activities, VF and 
VR, might be a function of their ex ante decisions about the scope of 
their activities, their products or services, the number of their employ­
ees, and their investments in the employees' human capital. Similarly, 
the harm that would result from joint operation by Resort and Fac­
tory, H, might also be a function of various ex ante actions and in-
620 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:601 
vestments. For example, the magnitude of H might depend on the ex­
tent to which Factory or Resort invested to reduce the reliance of their 
respective activities on the river's water. 
I will denote below as xF and xR the investments made ex ante by 
Factory and Resort respectively in enhancing the value of their respec­
tive activities. I will also denote below as y F and y R the investments in 
harm-reduction made by· Factory and Resort respectively. I will as­
sume that all these investments have the standard feature of dimin­
ishing marginal effectiveness, with each additional dollar invested pro­
ducing a positive but diminishing benefit. 
Which ex post allocation of entitlements would provide the parties 
with the best incentives for making these ex ante investments? In ex­
amining this question, I will assume that courts cannot observe the 
level of ex ante investments and that the ex post allocation of entitle­
ments thus cannot be made dependent on such investments.21 Fur­
thermore, I will focus on choosing a rule from among the four basic 
legal rules that Calabresi and Melamed identified. 
If the parties could negotiate ex ante - that is, prior to making 
their investments - they could adopt an arrangement that would gov­
ern the ex post allocation of entitlements. Even in such a case, it would 
be valuable for lawmakers to identify the optimal arrangement and 
provide it as a default. Moreover, in many situations where parties can 
be expected to bargain ex post with ease, bargaining ex ante might still 
be difficult, or even impossible, to conduct and successfully conclude. 
In particular, conditions necessary for easy bargaining, such as ab­
sence of informational asymmetries, might obtain ex post but not ex 
ante. Even when parties are ex post informed about each other's po­
tential payoffs, they might not possess such information ex ante. For 
example, before the parties make their respective investments ex ante, 
Factory and Resort might have some private information regarding 
the effectiveness of their respective investments. After those invest­
ments are made, and after the ex post situation crystallizes, the poten­
tial payoff of each party might become apparent to the other side, but 
that might not have been the case ex ante. The presence of ex ante in­
formational asymmetries might therefore impede ex ante bargaining 
and might make the choice of legal rule especially important. 
Before proceeding to analyze how alternative rules affect ex ante 
investments, let me note two assumptions that I will use for simplicity 
of exposition. First, I will assume that ex ante investments do not 
determine which of the three scenarios (FR, F, or R) will occur. Which 
scenario · even:tually materializes will be assumed to depend on exoge­
nous developments, say, in the markets within which Factory and Re-
21. This assumption is similar to the standard assumption made in the incomplete con­
tracts literature that parties' ex ante investments are noncontractible. See, e.g. , HART, supra 
note 6. 
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sort operate. Ex ante investments, however, will be assumed to influ­
ence parties' potential payoffs under each scenario. 
Second, I will use specific numerical examples for the probabilities 
of the three scenarios. It will be clear, however, that the reasoning and 
q�alitative conclusions of the analysis will apply equally to any other 
values that these probabilities might take. Specifically, I will assume 
that the probability of scenario FR (in which it is efficient for both 
Factory and Resort to operate) equals 1/2; that the probability of sce­
nario F (in which it is efficient for only Factory to operate) equals 1/3; 
and that the probability of scenario R (in which only Resort should 
operate) equals 1/6. 
B. Investment by Factory to Enhance the Value of Its Activity 
1. The Socially Optimal Investment Level 
From a social point of view, a party should invest up to the point 
where marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost, such that 
one dollar of investment produces one dollar of expected social value. 
In our example, enhancement of VF will provide social value only in 
those scenarios - F and FR -:- in which Factory will actually operate. 
Consequently, the social value of increasing VF by $1 will be equal to 
$1 multiplied by the combined probability of these two scenarios, 
which is 5/6 (113 + 112) in our example. Thus, Factory should invest 
only up to the point where 5/6 of the marginal increase in VF produced 
by an additional dollar of investment falls to $1 .22 As I now turn to 
show, however, Factory's private calculus for its investment in en­
hancing VF might diverge from the socially optimal calculus. 
2. Investment Under Alternative Rules 
a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. As Part III 
demonstrated, if Resort is given the entitlement with property-right 
protection, then Resort will be ·able to extract value from Factory 
whenever it is efficient for Factory to pollute. Thus, under an RP rule, 
Resort will allow Factory to operate in scenarios FR and F in exchange 
for part of the value produced by Factory's activity. Assuming that the 
parties enjoy equal bargaining power, we haye concluded in Section 
III that, in scenarios FR and F, Factory will capture only half of any 
marginal increase in the value of Vr 
22. This means that the socially optimal investment x satisfies 516 * V/(x) = 1.  More 
generally, if P, and P,. denote the probabilities of scenarios F and FR, respectively, then the 
optimal investment x will satisfy (P, + P,.) * V/(x) = J .  
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Consider now Factory's private calculus as to how much to invest 
ex ante. Factory will, of course, bear the full cost of every dollar of 
marginal increase in its investment, xF' Factory will benefit from a 
marginal increase in the value of VF, however, only in scenarios F and 
FR, which have a combined probability of 516. Moreover, even in 
those scenarios Factory will capture only half of the marginal increase 
in value of VF. 
It follows that Factory will have no incentive to invest beyond the 
point where 5/12 (which is 5/6 * 112) of the resulting marginal increase 
in VF produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.23 This im­
plies that Factory will set its level of investment, xF, below the socially 
optimal level because Factory will expect Resort to capture half of the 
return produced by Factory's investment. Essentially, Factory will 
bear the full cost of increasing xF but, under the RP rule, will capture 
only half of the resulting social benefits. For this reason, Factory's in­
centives to invest will be inadequate, and Factory will invest too little.24 
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. If Resort re­
ceives the entitlement but with only liability-rule protection, Factory 
will have to pay damages to Resort in scenarios F and FR. Recall, 
however, that these payments of damages to Resort (H in scenario FR 
and VR in scenario F) will not depend on the value of Factory's activ­
ity, VF' 
Consider Factory's private calculus as to how much to invest ex 
ante under this rule. Again, Factory will bear the full cost of every 
dollar of marginal increase in its investment, xF, and will benefit from 
any resulting increase in VF only with a probability of 516, the com­
bined likelihood of scenarios F and FR. Unlike the RP rule, however, 
the RL rule will allow Factory to capture in these two scenarios the 
full marginal increase in VF because Factory's payment to Resort un­
der the RL rule will not depend on the value of VF' Therefore, Factory 
will invest up to the point where 5/6 of the increase in VF produced an 
additional $1 investment falls to $1 .25 
This conclusion implies that, under the RL rule, Factory will invest 
at the socially optimal level. Because the payment that Factory will 
23. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy 516 * 112 * V/(x) = 1.  
More generally, let us assume that the bargaining between the parties will result in Resort's 
capturing a fraction <P of the surplus and Factory's capturing the remaining fraction (J - ¢) of 
the surplus. Under this more general assumption, Factory's investment would satisfy (PF + 
PF.) * (1 - </J) * V/(x) = 1 .  
24. This result is similar to the standard result in the analysis of the standard hold-up 
problem: when the value that a party A produces can be expected to become subject to a 
hold-up by party B, party A will underinvest in enhancing this value. See, e.g. , HART, FIRMS, 
CONTRACTS, supra note 6, at 39-42. 
25. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy 516 * V/(x) = 1, which is 
the condition defining the socially optimal level of investment. See supra note 22. More gen­
erally, Factory's investment would satisfy (PF + PF.) * V/(x) = 1 .  
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have to make to Resort when Factory operates will not depend on the 
value of Factory's activity, VF, Factory will be the "residual claimant" 
that captures the full value of marginal increases in Vr As a result, 
Factory's private incentives will induce it to invest optimally. 
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Granting 
Factory an entitlement with property-right protection will enable it to 
capture value not only in scenarios F and FR but also in scenario R, in 
which it is efficient for Factory to shut down its activity. In scenario R 
Factory will be able to extract a payment from Resort in return for not 
polluting. As Section III.C showed, in scenario R Factory will receive 
an amount equal to VF, the amount Factory would be giving up by 
shutting down its polluting activity plus, under the assumption of equal 
bargaining power, half of the surplus produced by Factory's shutting 
down, a surplus which will equal the lesser of (H -VF) or (VR - VF) . 
Thus, Factory would get an amount equal to VF plus half of the higher 
of (H -VF) and (VR -VF) ,  or, equivalently, half of VF plus half of the 
higher of H and Vw 
Now consider Factory's investment decision under the FP rule. As 
always, Factory will bear the full cost of every marginal increase in its 
investment. Factory will also capture the full value of its activity, VF, in 
scenarios F and FR, which have a combined probability of 5/6, in 
which Factory will operate. Finally, in scenario R, in which Factory 
will shut down, Factory will still gain an amount equal to half of VF 
plus half of the higher of H and V w Thus, on the whole, Factory will 
make an expected gain of 11112 of each marginal increase in Vr Fac­
tory therefore will invest up to the point where the marginal increase 
in VF produced by an additional $1 investment falls to $11112.26 
Recall, however, that Factory's socially optimal level of investment 
is at the point where 5/6 of the marginal increase in VF falls to $1. It 
follows that Factory will adopt under the FP rule an excessive - that 
is, higher than socially optimal - level of investment Xr 
Essentially, because Factory will be able to obtain benefit from an 
increase in VF even in scenario R, in which Factory's activity would 
shut down and produce no social value, Factory will obtain from its in­
vestment some extra private benefits that will not reflect social value. 
This divergence between the private and social calculus will lead Fac­
tory to invest excessively.27 
26. Formally, Factory's actual investment would satisfy [516 + (116 * 112)] * V/(x) = 1. 
More generally, relaxing the assumption of equal bargaining power, Factory's investment 
would satisfy (PF + PFR + (1 - </!) P.) * V/(x) = 1 .  
· 
27. This result is similar to those results in the law and economics literature showing 
that, in some contexts, compensating a party for a value that is not going to be in fact real­
ized might lead to overinvestment. For example, Steve Shavell has shown that the expecta­
tion damages remedy in contracts will lead to overinvestmerit in reliance. The relying party 
will disregard the fact that its investment would not produce social value in the event that the 
contract is breached because it would be compensated by the other side. See Steven Shavell, 
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d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Let us now 
turn to the rule that also gives the entitlement to Factory but with only 
liability-rule protection. Under this rule, Factory would again be able 
to capture value not only in scenarios F and FR but also in scenario R 
in which it would shut down its activity. In scenario R, Resort would 
be able to make Factory shut down but would have to pay Factory the 
forgone value of its Vr 
Thus, under the FL rule, Factory will capture the marginal increase 
in the value of VF resulting from its investment in every scenario, in­
cluding scenario R in which the increase in the value of VF would pro­
duce no social value. Thus, Factory will invest up to the point where 
the increase in VF from an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.28 
This level of investment by Factory will exceed the socially optimal 
level. Furthermore, under the FL rule Factory would capture in sce­
nario R the full marginal increase in the value of VF produced by addi­
tional investment, whereas under the FP rule Factory would capture in 
this scenario only half of such a marginal increase. It follows that the 
FL rule would distort Factory's incentives even more severely in the 
direction of excessive investment than would the FP rule.29 
C. Resort's Ex Ante Investment to Enhance the Value of Its Activity 
1. The Socially Optimal Investment Level 
As already noted, from a social point of view, a party should invest 
only up to the point where the marginal expected social value from 
additional investment falls to its marginal cost. Increasing the value of 
Vn would produce a social benefit only in scenarios R and FR, and it 
would produce no social value in scenario F in which Resort would 
Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 1 1  BELL J. ECON. 466 (1980). Similarly, Robert 
Cooter and Louis Kaplow have suggested that full compensation for government takings 
leads to overinvestment because parties disregard the fact that their investments might not 
produce social value in the event that their property is taken by the government. See Robert 
Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1985); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 
(1986). 
28. Formally, Factory's investment under the rule would satisfy V/(x) = 1 .  
29. Under the F L  rule, Factory will net a lesser share o f  the total ex post value than un­
der the FP rule. As a consequence, Factory might appear at first glance to have a weaker 
incentive to overinvest in VF under the FL rule than under the FP rule. The FL rule, how­
ever, provides a stronger incentive on the margin to increase V,.. Under the FL rule, Factory 
will capture in scenario R the full value of any increase in the value of V,.. In contrast, under 
the FP rule in scenario R, Factory would in addition get half of the surplus - which would 
be v. - VF or H - VF - created by Factory's shutting down: Because increasing VF would re­
duce this surplus, this extra element of value under the FP rule would operate to mitigate the 
incentive to overinvest in increasing V,.. As a result, the overinvestment under the FP rule 
will be less severe than under the FL rule. 
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shut down its activity. Accordingly, an increase of $1 in the value of VR 
would produce a social gain of $1 only in scenarios R and FR, which 
have in our example a combined probability of 2/3 (116 + 112). 
Resort should invest, then, up to the point where 2/3 of the 
marginal increase in the value of VR produced by an additional $1 of 
investment falls to $1 .30 As we shall presently see, however, Resort's 
private calculus would differ from the social calculus under some of 
the alternative rules, and Resort would under these invest in enhanc­
ing the value of its activity at an inefficient level. 
2. Investment Under Alternative Rules 
a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. Granting 
the entitlement to Resort with property-right protection will enable 
Resort to capture value not only in scenarios R and FR but also in sce­
nario F, in which Resort would shut down its activity. In this scenario, 
in return for allowing Factory to operate, Resort would be able to ex­
tract from Factory a payment equal to VR, the forgone value of Re­
sort's activity, plus half of VF - VR, the surplus produced by the ex­
change.31 
Now consider Resort's inve.stment decision. As always, Resort will 
bear the full cost · of each additional $1 investment in enhancing the 
value of its activity. Resort will also benefit from the full value of mar­
ginal increases in VR in scenarios R and FR, which have a combined 
probability of 2/3. Furthermore, in scenario F, which has a probability 
of 1/3, Resort will capture half of any marginal increase in the value of 
VR. 
It follows that Resort will have . an incentive to invest up to the 
point where 5/6 (213 + {113 * 112]) of the marginal increase in the value 
of VR produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1 .32 By con­
trast, the socially optimal level of investment for Resort is, as noted 
above, at the point where 2/3 of the marginal increase in VR falls to $1. 
It follows that the level of investment chosen by Resort will be socially 
excessive. 
Essentially, increases in the value of VR would provide Resort with 
some private benefits that would not reflect a social gains but merely a 
transfer of value from Factory. Because additional investment would 
30. This means that the socially optimal investmen.t must satisfy 213 .* V,'(x) = 1: More 
generally, if P. and P,. denote the probabilities of scenarios R and FR respectively, then the 
optimal investment will be defined by (P. + P,.) * V,'(x) = 1 .  
3 1 .  The net value that Resort will obtain under the R P  rule in scenario F thus equals 
0.5(V. + V,) . See supra Section IIl.C. 
32. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy {213 + (112 * 113)} * V,'(x) 
= 1 .  More generally, Resort's investment would satisfy [P. + P,. + (1 - </!) * P,} * V,'(x) = 1 .  
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produce for Resort private benefits exceeding the produced social 
gains, Resort will invest excessively under the RP rule. 
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the 
rule that gives the entitlement to Resort with liability-rule protection, 
Resort will again obtain value not only in scenarios R and FR but also 
in scenario F in which it would not operate. In scenario F, Resort 
would shut down its activity but it would receive from Factory com­
pensation for the value of its forgone activity VR'33 Thus, under the RL 
rule Resort will capture the full value of marginal increases in VR in all 
three scenarios. 
Under the considered rule, then, Resort will capture the marginal 
increase in the value of VR also in scenario F, in which the increase in 
value of VR would produce no social value. Resort thus will elect to in­
vest up to the point where the marginal increase in the value of VR 
produced by an additional $1 of investment falls to $1 .34 This level of 
investment will exceed the socially optimal level. 
Essentially, Resort's private gains from enhancing the value of VR 
would exceed the social gains from such an increase. Furthermore, un­
der the RL rule, Resort would capture the full value of any marginal 
increase in the value VR, whereas under the RP rule Resort would cap­
ture only a fraction of the increase in the value of VR'35 Hence, the RL 
rule would distort Resort's incentives in the direction of excessive in­
vestment even more severely than the RP rule would. 
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Under the 
FP rule Factory's property right will enable it to extract value from 
Resort in scenario R. In th,is scenario, in which it would be efficient for 
only Resort to operate, Factory would agree to shut down its activity 
in exchange for compensation from Resort.36 
33. By hypothesis,' only Factory should operate in scenario F. Thus, under the RL rule, 
the damages that Factory would pay to Resort in scenario F would equal v •. Resort would 
receive this payment and willingly shut down. See also supra Section 111.B. 
34. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy V/(x) = 1. 
35. Note that, whereas the total value with which Resort will end up under the RP rule 
may exceed that under the RL rule, Resort's incentive to invest in enhancing the value of its 
activity under the RL rule is stronger on the margin than under the RP rule. The reason for 
this is similar to the one given earlier for why Factory's incentive to invest in enhancing the 
value of its activity is higher under the FL rule than under the FP even though Factory's final 
value is higher under the .latter rule. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
36. · Recall that the entitlement that Factory would enjoy represents the freedom to en­
gage in its activity, i.e., to pollute the river. Consequently, Factory can transfer the entitle­
ment and thereby extract value from Resort only if Factory completely shuts down its pol­
luting activity. This can occur only in scenario R, in which Factory should shut down its 
activity anyway. In scenario FR, Factory would not be willing to shut down its activity and 
thus could not transfer its entitlement and extract value from Resort, whether under the FP 
rule or the FL rule. By contrast, the entitlement that Resort would enjoy represents simply 
the freedom from pollution, such that transfer of the entitlement would not require Resort to 
shut down its activity but merely to suffer simultaneously the presence of pollution. Thus, 
granting the entitlement to Resort with property-right protection would enable it to extract 
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Furthermore, in the case in which pollution would be too costly for 
Resort to bear and operate - that is, the case in which VR < H - the 
amount that Factory will be able to extract depends on the value of Vw 
In this case, under the assumption of equal bargaining power, Factory 
will be able to capture in scenario R half of any marginal increase in 
the value of Resort's activity. 
Turning to Resort's private calculus as to how much to invest ex 
ante, we start by noting that, in scenario FR, which has a probability of 
112, Resort would capture fully any marginal increase in the value of 
Vw In scenario R, however, which has a probability of 1/6, Resort 
would capture only half of the marginal increase in the value of Vw 
Thus, Resort will have an incentive to invest only up to the point 
where 7/12 (that is, 112 + {116 * 112]) of the marginal increase in the 
value of VR produced by an additional $1 investment falls to $1 .37 
It follows that Resort will set its level of investment below the 
socially optimal level. The underlying intuition is that, under the FP 
rule, Resort will bear the full cost of increasing xR, but will capture 
only part of the resulting benefits. The remainder of the expected 
benefits that Resort's investment will produce will go to Factory. For 
this reason, Resort will have an insufficient incentive to invest at the 
socially optimal level. 
d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the 
FL rule, Resort will be required to pay damages to Factory in scenario 
R, in which it would be efficient for Factory to shut down its activity. 
Resort's payment in 'scenario R, however, would equal the forgone 
value of Factory's activity and would not depend on the value of Re­
sort's activity. Thus, Factory would not be able to extract from Resort 
any portion of marginal increases in VR produced by Resort's ex ante 
investment. 
Turning to Resort's private calculus, note that Resort will capture 
fully marginal increases in the value of VR in scenarios R and FR, 
which have a combined probability of 2/3. Therefore, Resort will in­
vest up to the point where 2/3 of the marginal increase in the value of 
VR from an additional $1 of investment falls to $1.38 Thus, Resort will 
invest as the socially optimal level. 
The intuition underlying this conclusion is that although Factory 
would be able to extract in scenario R some payment from Resort, this 
value from Factory not only in scenario F, in which Resort would shut down, but also in sce­
nario FR, in which Resort would continue to operate despite the pollution. 
37. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy 7112 * V/(x) = 1. More 
generally, relaxing the assumption that v. < H, Resort's investment would satisfy [P,. + P. * 
a * </>] *  V/(x) = 1, where a denotes the probability that v. > H in the event that scenario R 
takes place. 
38. Formally, Resort's investment under the rule would satisfy 416 * V/(x) = 1, which is 
the condition defining the socially optimal level of investment. See supra note 30. 
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payment would not depend on the value of VR; since Resort wc;mld re­
ceive in this scenario the excess of VR over the damages payments 
made to Factory, Resort would fully capture marginal increases in VR 
produced by its investment and thus would be the "residual claimant." 
Because Resort would fully capture the expected social benefits from 
its investment in enhancing the value of its activity, its private calculus 
would align with that of social optimality. 
e. Comparing the Rules. We can now put together our conclusions 
concerning how alternative rules would affect Factory and Resort's in­
vestments in enhancing the values of their respective activities. Table 5 
summarizes these conclusions: 
TABLE 5. VALUE-ENHANCING INVESTMENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
RULES 
Factory's Investment Resort's Investment 
Rule in Enhancing V, in Enhancing VR 
RP Suboptimal Excessive 
RL Optimal Most Excessive 
FP Excessive Suboptimal 
FL Most Excessive Optimal 
As Table 5 indicates, none of the four rules can induce the optimal 
levels of both xF and xw Each of the two property-right rules, RP and 
FP, would lead both parties to invest inefficiently, with the party re­
ceiving the entitlement investing excessively and the other party in­
vesting suboptimally. Each of the two liability rules, RL and FL, 
would lead the party receiving the entitlement to invest optimally, but 
the other party would invest excessively - and to a greater extent 
than in the case in which the party receiving the entitlement was given 
property-right protection. 
· 
D. Ex Ante Investments in Harm Reduction 
1. Socially Optimal Investment Levels 
Having examined how alternative legal rules affect parties' invest­
ments in enhan�ing the value of their respective activities, I now turn 
to consider how these rules affect the parties' ex ante investments, YR 
and y F• in reducing the magnitude of the potential harm H in the event 
of joint operation. From a social point of view, each party should 
invest in harm reduction up to the point where the expected social 
benefit from an additional $1 of such investment falls to $1. 
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In determining marginal social benefit, we must take into account 
that the potential harm would actually occur only in scenario FR, 
which has a probability of 1/2. Thus, the expected social benefit from a 
given reduction in H is equal to only half of this reduction. Thus, it 
would be socially optimal for Factory to invest up to the point where 
1/2 of the marginal reduction in H produced by an additional $1 of in­
vestment by Factory is equal to $1 .39 Similarly, from a social point of 
view, Resort should invest up to the point where 1/2 of the marginal 
reduction in H produced by an additional dollar of investment by Re­
sort is equal to $1 .40 
2. Investment Under Alternative Rules 
a. Entitlement to Resort with Property-Right Protection. Let us start 
with Factory's investment in harm reduction under the RP rule. Under 
this rule, Factory will make a payment to Resort to get its permission 
for Factory's activity only in scenario FR in which the harm would ac­
tually occur. In this scenario, Factory will end up with a value of 0.5VF 
- 0.5H.41 Thus, should scenario FR occur, Factory would capture half 
of the savings from any marginal reduction in H. 
Accordingly, when Factory decides how much to invest, it will rec­
ognize that its expected benefit from increasing y F by $1 will equal 1/4 
(112 * 112) of the reduction in the value of H produced by such a mar­
ginal additional investment. Thus, Factory will invest up to the point 
where 114 of the reduction in the value of H produced by an additional 
$1 of investment falls to $1. 
It follows that Factory's level of investment in harm reduction will 
fall below the socially optimal level. The intuition behind this conclu­
sion is that, although Factory will bear the full cost of any marginal in­
crease in y F' it will share with Resort the expected benefits from such 
investment, that is, the savings in scenario FR from a reduction in the 
value of H. As a result, compared with what would be socially optimal, 
Factory will invest too little. 
For similar reasons, Resort will also invest suboptimally in harm 
reduction under the RP rule. The harm will affect Resort also only in 
scenario FR, and Resort would be able to capture in this scenario only 
half of the benefits from any reduction in the value of H. Thus, Resort 
will invest up to the point where 1/4 of the marginal reduction in H 
39. Formally, Factory's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would be defined 
by 112 * Hy/(y) = -1. More generally, Factory's optimal level of investment in harm reduc­
tion would satisfy: PF• *  Hy/(y) = -1 . 
40. Formally, Resort's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would satisfy: 112 * 
Hy/(y) = -1. More generally, Resort's optimal level of investment in harm reduction would 
satisfy: PF• *  Hy/(y) = -1. 
41. See supra Section III.A. 
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produced by an additional $1 investment by Resort falls to $1. Thus, 
because Resort will bear the full costs of increasing its investment in 
harm reduction but will share the expected benefits of such reduction 
with Factory, Resort will invest too little compared with what would 
be socially optimal. 
b. Entitlement to Resort with Liability-Rule Protection. Under the 
RL rule, which gives Resort the entitlement with liability-rule protec" 
tion, Factory will pay Resort damages in the amount of H in scenario 
FR. Thus, in this scenario, which has a probability of 112, Factory 
would capture all the benefits from any given reduction in the value of 
H. Using reasoning similar to that used earlier, we can conclude that 
Factory will invest up to the point where 112 of the reduction in H re­
sulting from an additional $1 of investment by Factory is equal to $1. 
It follows that Factory will invest optimally in harm reduction. Es­
sentially, under the RL rule Factory will both bear the full social costs 
of a marginal · increase in its investment level and capture the full 
expected social benefits resulting from such investment. 
In contrast, Resort's level of investment in harm reduction will be 
zero. This inefficiency arises because in scenario FR, in which the 
harm H would actually occur, Resort would receive full compensation 
from Factory. Thus, Resort will not get any benefit from reductions iri 
the value of H, and Resort thus will have no incentive to make any in­
vestment to lowering the value of H.42 
c. Entitlement to Factory with Property-Right Protection. Under the 
FP rule, which gives the entitlement to Factory with property-right 
protection, Factory will make no payments to Resort in scenario FR, 
in which the harm H would actually materialize. Thus, Factory's pay­
off in scenario FR will not depend on the value of H. Indeed, under 
certain conditions, an increase in H would in fact benefit Factory by 
increasing the amount that Factory would be able to extract from 
Resort in scenario R.43 
Factory thus would have no incentive to make any ex ante invest­
ment in harm reduction, and will choose a zero level of investment, 
which will clearly fall below the socially optimal level. The problem is 
that, although Factory would bear the full cost of any investment it 
would make in harm reduction, it would derive none of the social 
42. This result is similar to the result in the economic analysis of torts showing that, 
when courts make injurers strictly liable for victims' losses, injurers will invest optimally in 
precautions and victims will make no investment in precautions. See, e.g. , STEVEN SHA VELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, ch. 2 (1987). 
43. Specifically, an increase in H will increase Factory's expected value in scenario R if 
v. > H. In that situation, an increase in H would raise the damages to Resort from Factory's 
pollution and thus would raise the surplus that would be generated (and partly captured by 
Factory) from Factory's shutting down its activity. 
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benefits produced by it and, indeed, might even suffer a loss from the 
resulting decrease in H. 
In contrast, Resort will invest excessively in harm reduction under 
the FP rule. In scenario FR, Resort would obtain no payment from 
Factory and would therefore bear the full cost of the harm. 
Furthermore, in scenario R, in which Factory would agree to shut 
down its activity and the potential harm would not materialize, a 
smaller value of H would decrease the damages to Resort from pollu­
tion and thereby improve Resort's bargaining position and decrease 
the amount that Factory would be able to extract from Resort in re­
turn for shutting down Factory's activity.44 
In considering how much to invest, Resort would take into account 
the benefit that it would obtain from a reduction in H both in scenario 
FR, where Resort's private benefit would fully reflect social benefit, 
and in scenario R, where Resort's private benefit would not reflect a 
social benefit but rather a transfer from Factory. Thus, because Resort 
will derive from its investment in harm reduction private benefits ex­
ceeding the social benefits, Resort will invest excessively. 
d. Entitlement to Factory with Liability-Rule Protection. Finally, 
under the FL rule, which gives the entitlement to Factory but with the 
protection of only a liability rule, Factory will in all three scenarios end 
up with the full value of its activity, Vr Thus, Factory's final value will 
in no way depend on the value of H. Therefore, Factory will derive no 
benefit from any reduction in H, will have no incentive to make any 
expenditures on harm reduction, and will make zero investment. 
By contrast, Resort's investment in harm reduction will be set at 
the socially optimal level. Under the FL rule, Resort will bear the full 
harm, H, only in scenario FR, which occurs with a probability of 1/2. In 
scenarios F and R, however, the value of H would have no effect on 
the value that Resort would obtain. Resort therefore will invest up to 
the point where 1/2 of the marginal reduction in H produced by an ad­
ditional $1 of investment by Resort falls to $1. As we have seen earlier, 
this level of investment will be socially optimal. 
·e. Comparing the Rules. Putting together the conclusions from the 
preceding subsections, Table 6 below summarizes our results con­
cerning how the parties' investments in harm reduction under the four 
different rules would compare with the socially optimal levels: 
44. Stated differently, reducing the value of H might decrease the amount that Factory 
would be able to extract in return for shutting down its activity in scenario R. Specifically, a 
decrease in H would reduce the expected payment that Resort would make to Factory in 
scenario R if v. > H. See supra Section 111.C. · 
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TABLE 6. INVESTMENTS IN HARM REDUCTION UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
RULES 
Factory's Investment Resort's Investment 
Rule in Reducing H in Reducing H 
RP Suboptimal Suboptimal 
RL Optimal Zero 
FP Zero Excessive 
FL Zero Optimal 
As Table 6 indicates, none of the rules will generally ensure that 
both Factory and Resort invest optimally in harm reduction. This state 
of affairs arises because none of the rules will enable both parties to 
capture the full social benefits produced by their respective invest­
ments in harm reduction. 
E. Taking Stock 
Having analyzed the effects of alternative rules both on parties' in­
vestments in enhancing the value of their respective activities and on 
parties' investments in harm reduction, we can now turn to an overall 
comparison of ex ante investments under the four legal rules: 
TABLE 7. OVERALL COMPARISON OF EX ANTE INVESTMENTS UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE RULES 
Factory's Resort's Factory's Resort's 
Investment Investment Investment in Investment in 
Rule in VF in VR Reducing H Reducing H 
RP Suboptimal Excessive Suboptimal Suboptimal 
RL Optimal Most Excessive Optimal Zero 
FP Excessive Suboptimal Zero Excessive 
FL Most Excessive Optimal Zero Optimal 
As Table 7 indicates, none of the rules can ensure that both parties 
will set both types of investments at the efficient level. Each rule will 
lead at least two of the four ex ante investments to deviate from the 
efficient level. Although each one of the rules involves some efficiency 
costs, the rules might well differ considerably in how far investment 
levels will fall short of efficiency. Therefore, the best rule from the 
perspective of ex ante investments is the one that would produce the 
lowest overall inefficiency costs. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF RULE 
633 
Having identified and analyzed how legal rules can affect ex ante 
actions and investments, I turn now to examine the implications of this 
analysis for the choice of rule. Section A discusses the implications of 
ex ante effects for the choice between property-right protection and 
liability-rule protection. Section B considers the choice of which party 
will be protected. Section C shows that, once we take ex ante consid­
erations into account, it would be worthwhile to consider an expanded 
menu of legal rules. Finally, Section D identifies a certain advantage 
· that government fines and taxes have over private law rules in ad­
dressing problems of ex ante incentives. 
A Property-Right Protection vs. Liability-Rule Protection 
One important contribution of the existing literature has been to 
identify certain important ex post advantages that liability rules enjoy 
over property rights when ex post bargaining is not easy.45 As the dis­
cussion below will explain, from the ex ante perspective, liability rules 
are not generally superior. Liability rules sometimes do work better 
than property rights, but sometimes they do not. 
For concreteness, let us suppose that we have decided to protect 
Resort against Factory's pollution, so that we now must decide only 
whether to protect with a property right or with a liability rule - that 
is, choose between RP and RL. The results displayed in Table 7 
suggest that, from the perspective of ex ante investments, RL might or 
might not work better than RP. 
To understand the · balance of considerations, let us first examine 
how these two rules affect Factory's ex ante investments. As Table 7 
indicates, a liability rule (RL) would lead Factory to make more effi-
. cient investments than a property rule (RP) would. 
· 
Specifically, an RL rule would induce Factory to make both value­
enhancement and harm-reduction investments at the socially optimal 
level. In contrast, an RP rule would induce suboptimal levels of both 
types of investment. 
The RL rule, however, would produce inferior results with respect 
to Resort's ex ante investments. Although both an RL and an RP rule 
would lead Resort to invest excessively in value-enhancement, an RL 
rule would induce greater over-investment than an RP rule. Further-
45. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 3; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1; Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 3. Kaplow and Shavell conclude that there is a prima facie case for fa­
voring liability rules over property rights, id. at 721, but they list several factors (including 
investments by victims in reducing potential harm) that might still make property rights de­
sirable. 
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more, although both rules would induce suboptimal investment in 
harm-reduction by Resort, Resort would make no investment at all 
under the RP rule but would make a positive investment under the RL 
rule. 
Thus, the RP rule would produce higher efficiency costs with re­
spect to Factory's ex ante incentives, but the RL rule would produce 
higher efficiency costs with respect to Resort's ex ante incentives. 
Which rule would be better from an ex ante perspective will depend 
on the overall balance of these efficiency costs. Policymakers wishing 
to take ex ante efficiency into account should assess the relative mag� 
nitude, in the considered context or category of cases, of the factors 
identified above. 
Thus, from the ex ante perspective, no general, one-size-fits-all 
prescription exists. Different categories of cases might call for different 
forms of protection. Below I offer several observations about circum­
stances that would tend to make one form of protection superior to 
the other. 
First, when discouraging Factory from inefficient levels of invest­
ment is regarded as much more important than discouraging Resort 
from inefficient levels of investment, the RL rule will tend to be supe­
rior to the RP rule. The intuition underlying this observation runs as 
follows. The RL rule induces Factory to make optimal ex ante invest­
ments both in enhancing the value of its activity and in reducing H. On 
the other hand, Resort's deviations from optimality under the RL rule 
are greater than those under the RP rule. Hence, if Factory's devia­
tions have a sufficiently greater significance than Resort's deviations, 
the RL rule will be superior. 
We can make a similar observation about the case in which cur­
tailing Resort's deviations from efficient investment levels is viewed as 
much more important than reducing Factory's deviations. In this case, 
the RP rule will tend to be superior to the RL rule. 
Finally, the higher the likelihood that scenario F will materialize, 
the more the RL rule will tend to be superior to the RP rule. In sce­
nario F, in which only Factory will ultimately operate, Factory's ex 
ante investment in enhancing the value of its operations activity is 
valuable. In contrast, in this scenario, whatever investments were 
made be Resort in enhancing the value of its activity or in reducing 
harm would not produce any social benefit. Thus, the more likely sce­
nario F, the more important it is to provide incentives for Factory's ex 
ante investment in enhancing the value of its activity, and the less im­
portant it is to provide incentives for Resort's ex ante incentives. 
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B. Which Party Should Get the Entitlement? 
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We now turn to consider the entitlement allocation question: 
Which party should get the entitlement to the river's water? Should 
Factory have the right (whichever way it would be protected) to use 
the water for its activity, or should Resort have the right (again, 
whichever way it would be protected) to unpolluted water? For expo­
sitional convenience,. I will assume that, whichever party is chosen to 
get the entitlement, the party will be protected with a property right. 
Accordingly, the choice to be considered is between FP and RP. 
Again, the conclusions summarized in Table 7 indicate that neither 
rule generally dominates the other in terms of ex ante incentives. ·Each 
of them has some advantages and some. disadvantages when compared 
to the other. Consider first how the two rules compare in their effect 
on the parties' ex ante investments in enhancing the value of their re­
spective activities. Neither rule generally induces optimal investment 
by Factory in value enhancement. Whereas the RP rule will lead to 
suboptimal investment, the FP rule will lead to an excessive invest­
ment. Likewise, neither rule generally induces optimal investment by 
Resort in value enhancement: in Resort's case, the FP rule leads to 
suboptimal investment, whereas the RP rule leads to excessive invest­
ment. 
Consider next how these two rules compare in terms of their effect 
on investment in harm reduction. The RP rule always performs better 
than the FP rule with respect to Factory's investment: the FP rule will 
lead Factory to make zero investment, whereas the RP rule will lead to 
a positive (though still suboptimal) investment. With respect to Re­
sort's investment in harm reduction, however, neither rule generally 
dominates the other. The RP rule will lead Resort to make a subopti­
mal investment, and the FP rule will lead to excessive investment. 
From the perspective of ex ante efficiency, whether a property 
right for Resort or a property right for Factory would be better de­
pends on the various factors identified above. Again, the balance of 
these considerations might vary from one category of cases to another. 
It is worthwhile, however, to make some observations about circum­
stances that would tend to make one of these rules superior to the 
other. 
When it is especially important to prevent Factory's investment in 
value enhancement from falling below the efficient level, the ex ante 
perspective will tend to favor a property right for Factory� The FP rule 
leads Factory to invest excessively, whereas the RP rule leads to sub­
optimal investment. 
In contrast, when preventing Resort's investment from falling be­
low the efficient level is relatively more important, the ex ante per­
spective will tend to favor a property right for Resort. Whereas the FP 
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rule will lead to suboptimal investment, the RP rule will lead to exces­
sive investment. 
As for investments in harm reduction, the more importance is at­
tached to having Factory make at least some investment in harm re­
duction, the more one would tend to favor the RP rule. Whereas the 
FP rule leads to zero investment by Factory, the RP rule ensures posi­
tive (though still suboptimal) investment. 
In contrast, when Resort's investment in harm reduction is espe­
cially important, the FP rule will tend to be superior. The RP rule will 
lead Resort to make a suboptimal investment in harm reduction, 
whereas the FP rule will lead to excessive investment. 
C. . Should We Expand the Menu of Rules? 
One important contribution of the Calabresi and Melamed article 
comes from their classification of four basic alternative rules to deal 
with the extemality problem. Subsequent literature followed this clas­
sification for quite a while, with researchers focusing on these four 
rules or on a subset of them. In the past several years, however, re­
searchers have put forward additional creative rules, based on the pro­
vision of put and call options, to address situations in which courts 
cannot accurately observe parties' payoffs.46 As long as courts can be 
assumed to know the parties' payoffs, however, researchers analyzing 
liability rules have generally assumed that such rules should set liabil­
ity at a level equal to the harm to one party from the other party's de­
cisions and actions. Moreover, when courts are uncertain about the ac­
curate level of harm, researchers have generally assumed that liability 
rules would not set liability levels above or below the range of values 
within which the damages might actually fall. 
Once we recognize that the division of value matters in terms of ex 
ante incentives, however, we can see that an expanded menu of legal 
rules might be beneficial. In particular, it might be useful to use liabil­
ity rules in which liability is intentionally set at a level that is known to 
be higher or lower than actual damages harm. 
Consider our comparison of how the RP and the RL rules divide 
ex post value. In the event that Factory operates, the RL rule enables 
Resort to receive an amount equal only to Resort's harm, whereas the 
RP rule enables Resort to receive a part of Factory's surplus. As a re­
sult, the RL rule performs better in terms of Factory's investments, 
whereas the RP rule performs better in terms of Resort's investments. 
These divisions of value produced by the RL and RP rules, how­
ever, represent just two points along a c.ontinuum of possible ex post 
divisions of value. Other points on this continuum, representing differ-
46. See supra note 1 1  and sources cited therein. 
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ent .divisions of value, might produce a better mix of investments. 
Thus, over- or undercompensatory damages, set above or below the 
estimated harm, might sometimes lead overall to more desirable levels 
of ex ante investments. 
For example, when faced with a choice between RL and RP, we 
might want to consider also a supercompensatory liability rule under 
which, in the event that Factory pollutes, Factory would have to pay 
Resort an amount equal, say, to 150% of its harm. Such an "interme­
diate" rule might provide a better mix of ex ante incentives than either 
one of RL or RP. Similarly, when we are trying to decide between RL 
and no entitlement to Resort, we might want to consider also a partial 
liability rule under which Resort would receive in the event that Fac­
tory pollutes only, say, 50% of its actual damages. 
To be sure, much work still remains before we can identify and 
analyze the effects of such "intermediate" rules and determine the cir­
cumstances under which they would be worthwhile. Once we recog­
nize the influence of ex ante investments, however, we should also 
recognize the value of exploring such an expansion of the menu from 
which legal rules are selected. 
D. Taxes and Fines 
The preceding analysis has shown that ·none of the considered al­
ternative rules can attain the "first-best" outcome - that is, induce ef­
ficient levels for all ex ante investments. Each rule produces some effi­
ciency costs, with at least one of the parties not having ex ante optimal 
incentives.47 Indeed, the logic of the analysis suggests that no ex post 
allocation of entitlements - that is, no method for dividing the total 
ex post value between the two parties - could fully eliminate all ex 
ante inefficiencies. There appears to be no way to divide the ex post 
value between the parties in such a way that both parties will at the 
same time capture fully and exactly the social benefits that increases in 
their ex ante investments generate.48 
In theory, however, under some conditions, we could provide op­
timal ex ante incentives to both parties through the imposition of gov­
ernment fines. Suppose that, without needing Resort's help, the gov­
ernment could ex post observe both whether Factory operates and 
47. See Table 7, supra, for a summary of the effects of the four rules on ex ante invest­
ments. 
48. Problems of this type should be familiar to students of law and economics from other 
contexts. For an excellent discussion, see Cooter, supra note 27. Although Cooter recognizes 
that this problem arises in a number of contexts, he does not notice that, in the presence of 
ex ante investments, it also arises in the context studied in this Article. Indeed, Cooter af­
firmatively suggests that such a problem does not arise in the context of nuisance disputes 
when courts use injunctive relief, i.e., property-right protection. See id. at 27-28. 
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what level of damages Resort suffers from Factory's pollution. And 
consider a Government-Fine rule under which, if Factory operates, it 
must pay the government a fine equal to the social cost of Factory's ac­
tivity, which is the damages from pollution to Resort. These damages, 
recall, will equal H when VR exceeds H, but will equal VR when H ex­
ceeds VR and Resort therefore can minimize its damages by shutting 
down. 
Under such a Government-Fine rule, each party will internalize all 
of the effects of its ex ante investments. As a consequence, ex ante 
both parties will make socially optimal investments both in enhancing 
the value of their own respective activities and in reducing potential 
harm. Essentially, the Government-Fine rule combines the efficiency 
advantages of both the RL and the FL rule with respect to the invest­
ments of both parties. 
To start, the Government-Fine rule leaves Factory in the position 
of the "residual claimant" on its value-enhancing investment. Factory 
will thus capture fully the marginal social benefits from such invest­
ment. Furthermore, because the Government-Fine rule requires Fac­
tory to pay in the event that it pollutes neither more nor less than the 
damages caused to Resort from pollution, Factory will invest optimally 
in harm reduction. Essentially, because Factory would face the same 
incentives under the Government-Fine rule as under the RL rule, Fac­
tory will face optimal ex ante incentives under the former as it does 
under the latter.49 
Furthermore, whereas the RL rule would not induce optimal in­
vestments on the part of Resort, the Government-Fine rule would. 
With respect to Resort's investments, the Government-Fine rule 
would produce the same effects as the FL rule. Recall that the FL rule 
leads Resort to make efficient ex ante investments because it makes 
Resort the "residual claimant" on its investments both in harm reduc­
tion and value enhancement.50 
The reason as to why the Government-Fine rule can combine the 
good effects of both the RL and FL rules is that, unlike the RL and FL 
rules, the Government-Fine rule is not limited to dividing the total ex 
post value between the two parties. Instead, by introducing the gov­
ernment as a third party, the Government-Fine rule makes Factory 
and Resort each bear the full social cost produced by the externality, 
which in turn provides both parties with optimal ex ante incentives. 
49. See supra Section IV.B(2)(ii) (discussing Factory's investment in enhancing its value 
under the RL rule); see also supra Section IV.D(2)(ii) (discussing Factory's investment in 
harm reduction under the RL rule). 
50. See supra Section IV.C.(2)(iv) (discussing Resort's investment in enhancing its value 
under the FL rule); see also supra Section IV.D(2)(iv) (discussing Resort's investment in 
harm reduction under the FL rule). 
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Although the law does sometimes use fines or taxes, the Govern­
ment-Fine rule is far from being generally used. The limited use of 
fines or taxes might be due to the fact that the assumptions in the 
above analysis often do not hold. First, a Government-Fine rule might 
not be triggered whenever Factory pollutes; why would Resort report 
Factory's pollution when Resort cannot expect any compensation?51 
Furthermore, even if pollution by Factory could be observed by the 
government, Resort would have no incentive to assist the government 
in assessing the damages suffered by Resort. Indeed, Resort might 
agree to help Factory, in return for a side payment, by doing whatever 
possible to lower the estimate of harm.52 These two problems might 
well place limits on our ability to take advantage of the potential bene­
fits of government fines. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
One of the basic questions confronting the law is how to allocate 
entitlements in the presence of externalities. This Article has focused 
on the effects that such allocations have on ex ante investments and 
actions. Once we take ex ante effects into account, the ex post alloca­
tion of entitlements, and the distributive effects it produces, might well 
be important even when parties can easily bargain ex post. By identi­
fying the various ex ante effects of alternative rules, this Article has 
sought to provide a framework for assessing such effects. Such assess­
ment should be an important element in the design of property rights 
and liability rules. 
5 1 .  The importance of private reporting often comes up as one of the relevant consid­
erations in choosing between private and public enforcement of law. See, e.g. , Steven Shaven, 
The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 267 (1993). 
At first glance, the problem might be solved by providing Resort with a financial reward 
for accurately reporting the magnitude of harm. As Shaven pointed out, however, when Fac­
tory's fine exceeds Resort's financial reward, Factory might induce Resort not to report by 
offering a side payment intermediate between the fine to Factory and Resort's financial re­
ward for reporting. 
